← Back to the use case

Knowledge check

DUKPT: a fresh key for every card payment at the counter

5 questions testing what you just read — no login, no tracking, just immediate feedback.

Question 1 of 5

What does the acquirer's host need in order to derive the key a PIN pad used for one particular transaction?

Question 2 of 5

Why does a PIN pad skip transaction counters with more than 10 (TDES) or 16 (AES) one bits?

Question 3 of 5

An attacker extracts every key from a stolen DUKPT PIN pad. What can they decrypt?

Question 4 of 5

In AES DUKPT, what keeps the PIN-encryption key and the MAC key of the same transaction separate?

Question 5 of 5

Which key, if compromised, exposes the keys of every device injected from it?

0 / 5 answered