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Knowledge check

Modes of operation & AEAD: ECB, CBC, CTR, GCM & ChaCha20-Poly1305

12 questions testing what you just read — no login, no tracking, just immediate feedback.

Question 1 of 12

Why does the penguin's outline survive AES-ECB encryption?

Question 2 of 12

Why is a scheme that always encrypts the same message to the same ciphertext not IND-CPA secure?

Question 3 of 12

What did the BEAST attack exploit in TLS 1.0's use of CBC?

Question 4 of 12

A message is exactly 16 bytes long. How does PKCS#7 pad it for AES-CBC?

Question 5 of 12

Two messages were encrypted with AES-CTR under the same key and nonce. What does XORing the two ciphertexts give an attacker?

Question 6 of 12

Which way of combining a cipher with a separate MAC did Bellare and Namprempre show to be secure in general?

Question 7 of 12

In an AEAD, what is the 'associated data'?

Question 8 of 12

With random 96-bit nonces, roughly how many messages does NIST SP 800-38D allow under one AES-GCM key?

Question 9 of 12

Why is ChaCha20-Poly1305 often preferred over AES-GCM on devices without AES hardware instructions?

Question 10 of 12

What does a nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD such as AES-GCM-SIV leak if a nonce is accidentally reused?

Question 11 of 12

Which NIST format-preserving encryption mode is still specified in the 2025 draft revision of SP 800-38G?

Question 12 of 12

FF1 encrypts the same card number to the same token every time. What does that cost?

0 / 12 answered